Determining Being-at-Work

I'm am going to intentionally keep this question as open ended as possible. Modern philosophers often criticize Aristotle for anthropomorphizing or imposing teleological constraints on nature. Chapter 9 of the metaphysics focuses on Being-at-work and potencies. To what extent do you grant Aristotle that A) being-at-work and potentiality aren't just imposed on nature and B) we can discover a thing's being-at-work/potentiality.

Metaphysics - Book VII

At the end of book VII in Chapter 17, after he's shown us how all the previous answers of "what is thinghood" were inadequate, I think he concludes that (a?) thinghood is the source of an independent thing that maintains itself.

I still feel kind of empty about this though, so here's my question (unless you'd rather correct what I just wrote):

Philosophically, what is the significance of this, and can we do anything with it, other than not get into the kind of philosophical missteps that the are being shown in the previous chapters of Book VII?

So Aristotle presents this impasse at the beginning of chapter 5: "if one denies that a statement that adds things together is a definition, will there be a definition of anything that is not simple but consists of things linked together?"  I still don't understand why this is an impasse at all, or rather why this should be an issue.  Why would anyone deny that a statement that adds things together is a definition?  It seems like such a person would say that composite things are undefinable, yet such things are those which are most worth defining.  What is the advantage of saying that there can be no definition of things that are not simple but things linked together?

Eric's Question for Book 6:

"Is time, being composed of a series of nows running into each other, a continuous, indivisible thing, or a series of divisible things all tied together by touching whole to whole? For if a now is a whole, time is not continuous, but if a now is merely an indivisible part of time, it does not really exist in and of itself. "

The Last Mover

In "The Relation of the Mover and the Moved" Aristotle asserts that, "A first mover, not as that for the sake of which but that from which the source of the motion is, is together with the thing moved."  My initial question was going to relate to the nature of this first mover, but upon looking ahead to the next few books in the Physics I realized that whatever questions I have will likely be answered in the future. 
So with that, I am still unsure about what the last mover would look like.  We know that, "Nothing is between the mover and the moved with respect to place," so the first and last movers would be "touching" the thing moved in the same way.  It would appear that these two movers would be opposites in some way, but I'm having difficulty conceptualizing this.  As of now I'm thinking of the last mover, possibly, as the exhaustion of a potency of some thing, maybe in some way connected to coming into being at rest.....but I think that idea could use some (lots of) work!

If a philosophy student falls in the forest, but nobody is there to discuss it, is Aristotle still right about everything?

Continuity

It seems plausible to suggest that in Book V Aristotle is taking the time to define and explain continuity because he believes it's essential in our understanding of motion.  On pg. 140 he says, "And it is clear from from this definition that the continuous is among those things out of which some one thing naturally comes into being as a result of their uniting. And in whatever way the continuous becomes one, so too will the whole be one, such as by a bolt or glue or a mortise joint, or by growing into one another." This section seems to be a quintessential part of Book V in which Aristotle is stressing the importance of looking at the continuity and the unity or wholeness that is present in motion. But why is it necessary for Aristotle to look at motion in terms of continuity? What are the consequences of not looking at motion in this way?

I Understood Time Until NOW

In class we learned that Aristotle thinks that time is a constant attribute of movements and does not exist on its own but is relative to the motions of things. Time is defined as "the number of movement in respect of before and after", so it cannot exist without succession; also he seems to say that to exist time requires the presence of a soul capable of "numbering" the movement. I understand why we need a soul present to “number” the time but the part I’m still confused on is his view on the “now”. I understand how a “now” cannot possibly exist with other “nows” and how you wouldn’t be able to connect them; however I cannot shake the idea that the “now” is the form from which time actualizes itself. We are all constantly existing in this “now” moment throughout all of time. If the “now” doesn’t exist then is the soul a separate being all together from time since we can never actually be IN it? Yet for time to exist the soul has to be there to number the movements still? Please help me pals.