Determining Being-at-Work

I'm am going to intentionally keep this question as open ended as possible. Modern philosophers often criticize Aristotle for anthropomorphizing or imposing teleological constraints on nature. Chapter 9 of the metaphysics focuses on Being-at-work and potencies. To what extent do you grant Aristotle that A) being-at-work and potentiality aren't just imposed on nature and B) we can discover a thing's being-at-work/potentiality.

Metaphysics - Book VII

At the end of book VII in Chapter 17, after he's shown us how all the previous answers of "what is thinghood" were inadequate, I think he concludes that (a?) thinghood is the source of an independent thing that maintains itself.

I still feel kind of empty about this though, so here's my question (unless you'd rather correct what I just wrote):

Philosophically, what is the significance of this, and can we do anything with it, other than not get into the kind of philosophical missteps that the are being shown in the previous chapters of Book VII?

So Aristotle presents this impasse at the beginning of chapter 5: "if one denies that a statement that adds things together is a definition, will there be a definition of anything that is not simple but consists of things linked together?"  I still don't understand why this is an impasse at all, or rather why this should be an issue.  Why would anyone deny that a statement that adds things together is a definition?  It seems like such a person would say that composite things are undefinable, yet such things are those which are most worth defining.  What is the advantage of saying that there can be no definition of things that are not simple but things linked together?

Eric's Question for Book 6:

"Is time, being composed of a series of nows running into each other, a continuous, indivisible thing, or a series of divisible things all tied together by touching whole to whole? For if a now is a whole, time is not continuous, but if a now is merely an indivisible part of time, it does not really exist in and of itself. "

The Last Mover

In "The Relation of the Mover and the Moved" Aristotle asserts that, "A first mover, not as that for the sake of which but that from which the source of the motion is, is together with the thing moved."  My initial question was going to relate to the nature of this first mover, but upon looking ahead to the next few books in the Physics I realized that whatever questions I have will likely be answered in the future. 
So with that, I am still unsure about what the last mover would look like.  We know that, "Nothing is between the mover and the moved with respect to place," so the first and last movers would be "touching" the thing moved in the same way.  It would appear that these two movers would be opposites in some way, but I'm having difficulty conceptualizing this.  As of now I'm thinking of the last mover, possibly, as the exhaustion of a potency of some thing, maybe in some way connected to coming into being at rest.....but I think that idea could use some (lots of) work!

If a philosophy student falls in the forest, but nobody is there to discuss it, is Aristotle still right about everything?

Continuity

It seems plausible to suggest that in Book V Aristotle is taking the time to define and explain continuity because he believes it's essential in our understanding of motion.  On pg. 140 he says, "And it is clear from from this definition that the continuous is among those things out of which some one thing naturally comes into being as a result of their uniting. And in whatever way the continuous becomes one, so too will the whole be one, such as by a bolt or glue or a mortise joint, or by growing into one another." This section seems to be a quintessential part of Book V in which Aristotle is stressing the importance of looking at the continuity and the unity or wholeness that is present in motion. But why is it necessary for Aristotle to look at motion in terms of continuity? What are the consequences of not looking at motion in this way?

I Understood Time Until NOW

In class we learned that Aristotle thinks that time is a constant attribute of movements and does not exist on its own but is relative to the motions of things. Time is defined as "the number of movement in respect of before and after", so it cannot exist without succession; also he seems to say that to exist time requires the presence of a soul capable of "numbering" the movement. I understand why we need a soul present to “number” the time but the part I’m still confused on is his view on the “now”. I understand how a “now” cannot possibly exist with other “nows” and how you wouldn’t be able to connect them; however I cannot shake the idea that the “now” is the form from which time actualizes itself. We are all constantly existing in this “now” moment throughout all of time. If the “now” doesn’t exist then is the soul a separate being all together from time since we can never actually be IN it? Yet for time to exist the soul has to be there to number the movements still? Please help me pals. 

Aristotle On The Void

Hey everyone!

     We commonly talk about "outer space" as being a vacuum, or perhaps that between a number of incredibly small molecules there exist gaps where there is no matter and thus is a void. As Aristotle points out, we commonly define void as "place devoid of body".

**Given what we've learned about place, is it even possible for the void, granting for arguments sake that it is, to exist in a place ?**

My hunch is that place, in a sense is defined by the bodies that occupy them; The void, being a non-body, is in no place and so is not a thing.

Last quick thought: Some say outer-space is a void. Response: The space between us on earth and the sun, is in a place, so is a body, thus not a void.

Bronson

Nature and Mathematics

Considering our discussion in class today, I've found myself mulling over a few different thoughts, all of which come from a primary consideration: the difference between Aristotle's conception of nature and a mathematical (contemporary) one. For example, a set of coordinates describes the location of an object based on a grid that we imagine spans the earth. New York City is roughly 40°N by 74°W, but there is not some ontological reality that is this coordinate set. The reality is New York City, the coordinates describe it as it relates to other things on earth. Another example is our concept of velocity: I might move from my chair to the door and think "hmm, I didn't move very quickly." But if I apply a mathematical perspective, I might say "in my movement from my chair to the door I sustained an average velocity of .3 meters per second." On the surface, it looks like all that math is doing is helping us to be more accurate in describing the world.

Here's my primary inquiry. Obviously the tool called math can't apply to things like "that-for-the-sake-of-which," ethical claims, and so forth. But it seems that concerning those things to which it can apply, it necessarily applies with greater accuracy than any alternative system.
Might we assert that any time we are able to make a claim about something using a mathematical system (in locomotion, for example), a similar claim that does not utilize this system is always inferior?

Infinity Qua Infinity

Aristotle makes this assertion: "For as it is, they have no need of the infinite (for they do not use it), but they need only that something finite can be as great as they want" (III.7.207b.30). Let's first look at Zeno's paradox with the walking to the door example. (It's important to use the word to here because with the word through you would simply walk through the doorway, hence making the paradox absurd and useless). Zeno's paradox seems troublesome to Aristotle because it does not depict the way in which reality actually operates; however, the concept that Zeno was describing is actually a simple, common occurrence in mathematical physics, (especially as described by calculus). What Zeno is describing is called an infinite series. Each successive move towards the door actually represents a distinct function that is mapped out by the infinite series. The series winds up looking something like this:

S1: 1/2....................................................................0.5
S2: (1/2)+(1/4)=(3/4).............................................0.75
S3: (1/2)+(1/4)+(1/8)=(7/8)...................................0.875
S4: (1/2)+(1/4)+(1/8)+(1/16)=(15/16)...................0.9375

And so on and so forth continuing on until infinity. As long as you keep on going another half of the distance, you will find that the total distance traveled gets closer and closer to the whole (1). If one were to use only "something finite that can be as great as one wants," they would certainly have some sort of silly answer, in this case an example would be 1/128. It is only through adding up every step of the infinite series that we see that the true value can be asserted to be 1, despite the fact that the numbers will never truly show it to be as such if you look at any one individual answer.

I strove with this example only to show the importance of the concept of infinity qua infinity. I made the example as simple as possible while still showing the nature of what is actually going on. Hopefully this explanation of Zeno's Paradox will either help your understanding of the nature of infinite series, or raise some interest as to the nature of Aristotle's "potential" infinity in relation/contrast to a mathematically relevant infinity.

Artistotle & Chance

I really do love how Aristotle handles chance and fortune. I'd echo and agree with Dr. Davis' comment that Aristotle manages to encsonce these terms into his existing framework without having to make any serious changes. I say all of this because I'm about to get pedantic.

If chance and fortunate are differentiated by a capacity to "make choices" (a rock versus a human), I have to wonder about situations where choice making beings (like said humans) temporarily lose the ability to make choices. It seems like a situation where you are being forced to do something against your will requires an explanation of its own. The weirdness can possibly be unpacked in this analogy/question:

If a man puts a gun in your hand and forces you to play Russian Roulette, is your subsequent death by chance, misfortune, or nature?

Physics III and Motion

     What I got from the first part of book III is how Aristotle describes motion and how it is infinite, and when it is combines with change we get nature as the outcome. It is also described as being 2-dimensional because there is no motion above or over things. If two things are of a certain kind, that is one that is capable of being moved and the other being capable of moving, these two things will act upon one another and allow one another to be acted upon.
    Using a building as an example, the things used for a building are both considered the buildable as buildable. This is equivalent to the process of building. When there is a house, the buildable is no longer buildable. It is the building being built, then the process of of building has to be the kind of actuality required. So then in this case building is a kind of motion.
     Part two seems to discuss more of the existence and what motion actually is. Even though it is thought to be indefinite, it doesn't exist as a potentiality or an acutality. This is concluded because of the reasons that it is incapable of having a certain size or going through a change of size. He keeps repeating the point that motion can only exist when it acts on both the "mover" and the "moved". When it acts, "this" or "such" will then be the cause of change.
     In part three he seems to continue on the subject of the composition of motion. Saying that motion is completed by 2 sides; a thing that is capable of causing motion, and it has to act on something that is capable of being moved. He starts talking about how there is a dialiectical difficulty because he says that "patiency" and "agency" are the two parts of motion and upon completion there is an 'action' and 'passion'. Then a conflict comes about, which is how can two things that exist as different things, be considered to react as one. Like even though in some perspective the travel from Road A to Road B is the same as Road B to Road A. In some aspect this must be true, but in actuality the paths are taken by deliberating two different ways.
      How can there be two separate components of motion, but they are acted upon as one. Or in other words, how can two things represent the same thing, but in actuality be different. At least that is how I interpreted everything. Putting my thoughts to paper was a lot tougher than I thought it would be.

Chance in Happiness

In Chapter 2, books 4-6 of the Physics, Aristotle extensively explores fortune and chance as causes. In at least one manner, fortune is an incidental cause stemming from a made choice. Chance, however, is broader and can occur without choice (197b). In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses chance as it relates to human happiness.  He consents to some things being caused by chance, but insists that the happy person will bear the misfortune calmly (Nichomachean Ethics- 1100b 30). However, how does the person attempting to achieve happiness, not yet there, bear chance? Presumably, there are a number of demonstrable things that help a human achieve happiness. Some of these could are of fortune; for instance, you chose to attend a college and happened upon a good education. However, think of the incidents related to chance that affect happiness. When you were a child, as Aristotle states, you could not choose (197b 9). Aristotle stresses that it is necessary to instill virtues (a component of happiness) into the youth, sometimes against their will (NE). But what if you are not immediately instilled with the virtues? Is in not by chance then (for you have no choice according to Aristotle) that you have been handicapped towards happiness?

Post Reading and Discussing Physics Book I- Mackenzie Foster

     After class today, I began to think about forms, materials, and potencies in regards to social responsibility. While I realize we cannot instill potencies in others (e.g., we cannot make it possible for a man to birth a child), we can focus our attention to the what potencies do exist in others. Aristotle's continual reference to the educated and uneducated (Sachs p.36 187a, p.37 line 188b, p.40 190a, p.41 190a20, etc.) makes it clear that all human beings (as long as they are healthy, still have mental capabilities, etc.) can be an educated human being because what one needs to educated is 1) to be a human being (which is the underlying thing/material/potency) and 2) to be uneducated, so a change occurs (which is a contrary/form/activity). The consequences of realizing this are that no one can make an argument that teens living in poverty are incapable of graduating high school, that homeless people are inherently incompetent, that the elderly are impotent in the face of learning new things, and so forth. They all have the material to be worked on. If we take this all to be true, how do we actualize this potency?

-Mackenzie

Hello and welcome to the Aristotle class blog. One post will be posted after each class (i.e. M and W before midnight). Post about what still confuses you, about the application of a promising idea, about a connection between sections or ideas, ask a question or propose a topic for further discussion. Try to keep posts under 200 words and comments under 60 (roughly speaking). [This post so far was 59 words, FYI.]

Oh and cite the books with line numbers when possible, i.e. Physics 185b10. The line numbers for Physics are embedded in the text. It is unfortunate, but that's just the way it is. The other texts have them in the margins.