What I got from the first part of book III is how Aristotle describes motion and how it is infinite, and when it is combines with change we get nature as the outcome. It is also described as being 2-dimensional because there is no motion above or over things. If two things are of a certain kind, that is one that is capable of being moved and the other being capable of moving, these two things will act upon one another and allow one another to be acted upon.
Using a building as an example, the things used for a building are both considered the buildable as buildable. This is equivalent to the process of building. When there is a house, the buildable is no longer buildable. It is the building being built, then the process of of building has to be the kind of actuality required. So then in this case building is a kind of motion.
Part two seems to discuss more of the existence and what motion actually is. Even though it is thought to be indefinite, it doesn't exist as a potentiality or an acutality. This is concluded because of the reasons that it is incapable of having a certain size or going through a change of size. He keeps repeating the point that motion can only exist when it acts on both the "mover" and the "moved". When it acts, "this" or "such" will then be the cause of change.
In part three he seems to continue on the subject of the composition of motion. Saying that motion is completed by 2 sides; a thing that is capable of causing motion, and it has to act on something that is capable of being moved. He starts talking about how there is a dialiectical difficulty because he says that "patiency" and "agency" are the two parts of motion and upon completion there is an 'action' and 'passion'. Then a conflict comes about, which is how can two things that exist as different things, be considered to react as one. Like even though in some perspective the travel from Road A to Road B is the same as Road B to Road A. In some aspect this must be true, but in actuality the paths are taken by deliberating two different ways.
How can there be two separate components of motion, but they are acted upon as one. Or in other words, how can two things represent the same thing, but in actuality be different. At least that is how I interpreted everything. Putting my thoughts to paper was a lot tougher than I thought it would be.
First of all, what is the line number for the "patiency and "agency" and 'action' and passion' to which you refer? I didn't remember seeing some of those words when I read, and then I skimmed through the text again and could not find them. Do you have a different translation than Sachs?
ReplyDeleteSecond of all, in regards to your questions at the end, I am not sure Aristotle is saying that there are two things that represent the same thing because in 202b21, he writes, "And to speak generally, teaching is not the same thing as learning in the highest and most proper sense, nor acting the same as being acted upon, but that to which these belong, the motion, is that same. For the being-at-work of this in that, and the being-at-work of this by the action of that, differ in meaning."
I should first admit I am utterly perplexed, so I have no idea if this is right. However, what I got from that was that the two things do not represent the same thing but actually differ in meaning. The two things are only united by their interval: motion.
-Mackenzie