Hey everyone!
We commonly talk about "outer space" as being a vacuum, or perhaps that between a number of incredibly small molecules there exist gaps where there is no matter and thus is a void. As Aristotle points out, we commonly define void as "place devoid of body".
**Given what we've learned about place, is it even possible for the void, granting for arguments sake that it is, to exist in a place ?**
My hunch is that place, in a sense is defined by the bodies that occupy them; The void, being a non-body, is in no place and so is not a thing.
Last quick thought: Some say outer-space is a void. Response: The space between us on earth and the sun, is in a place, so is a body, thus not a void.
Bronson
We commonly talk about "outer space" as being a vacuum, or perhaps that between a number of incredibly small molecules there exist gaps where there is no matter and thus is a void. As Aristotle points out, we commonly define void as "place devoid of body".
**Given what we've learned about place, is it even possible for the void, granting for arguments sake that it is, to exist in a place ?**
My hunch is that place, in a sense is defined by the bodies that occupy them; The void, being a non-body, is in no place and so is not a thing.
Last quick thought: Some say outer-space is a void. Response: The space between us on earth and the sun, is in a place, so is a body, thus not a void.
Bronson
The answer here seems to come down to semantics. What we commonly define the void as is a place without particles. There is certainly a way for that void to exist; it, in fact, does and this has been proven. This, however, does not seem to be the way in which Aristotle is talking about the void. He seems to define the void as a place in which there is no potential for anything. THIS concept of void would not be able to exist in a place because place is determined not only through an actualization of potency but also through potency itself. Aristotle talks about this in Book IV Chapter 5: "some things are in a place potentially, others actually." So if we are talking about bodies actually, then void would be possible, but since Aristotle makes the distinction that place need only have the potential to hold bodies, the void "is in no place and so is not a thing."
ReplyDeleteMy suggestion to fix misconceptions of the void by physics towards philosophy and philosophy towards physics is to create two definitions of "void": quantitative void and qualitative void. There is absolutely areas of quantitative void between us and the sun; however, in a philosophical sense discussing the purpose of the place that is between us in the sun, there is no qualitative void, and further, the qualitative void does not exist.
Aristotle talks about this in Book IV Chapter 5: "some things are in a place potentially, others actually." So if we are talking about bodies actually, then void would be possible, but since Aristotle makes the distinction that place need only have the potential to hold bodies, the void "is in no place and so is not a thing."
ReplyDelete---the distinction that Aristotle makes in regards to place -- is that place is no-where-potentially-without a body. THINGS are in place according to their potential or other times actual natural places. So still, the void is not possible in the sense of being 'a place of potential potency'.
At the same time, I don't even see the point of resuscitating the void at all. What do you need it in your philosophical system for ?
ReplyDeleteor scientific, if you see a distinction.
DeleteTo point to the end of Tucker's comment, I wonder if there really is a quantitative void between us and the sun. Quantity MUST apply to something that exists (in the way a rock exists), and I think Aristotle just as readily dismissed a quantitative void as he does a qualitative void. If I ask "Is there stuff between us and the sun?" then you may reply, "there are many pockets of no particles." But the same applies to everywhere! Instead of particles, we're talking about good, real reality. And if what we're really talking about is the distance between things, then its all relational measurements, leaving no true quantitative or qualitative lack, but instead a sea of potentiality and actuality, all consisting of relationships of beings. Or, to be thoroughly modern, gravity, photons, and so forth.
ReplyDeleteBut the real kicker: The spirit of Aristotle's system is not one that differs in semantics from the mathematical one. As Bronson pointed out, if we don't need a conception like "void," we may as well be rid of it. Let us simplify as much as possible. Afterward, we can reopen a toolkit and work on the WORLD through it, but why carry that toolkit with us everywhere? That's where I see his contention: we are deceived by superfluous concepts; we use them and carry them so often, we forget what the world is like without them.
Your second paragraph particularly reminds me a lot of the analytic philosophy we've read thus far in contemporary, including Russell and Wittgenstein, though I do not think only analytic philosophers think this way.
Deletewe use them and carry them so often, we forget what the world is like without them.
ReplyDeleteI like that.
I'm going echo off of some of Tucker's comments. "Semantics" might be a dirty word in this neck of the woods, but it does seem as Aristotle is concerned, "void" is to be taken synonymous for "nonsense."
ReplyDeleteIn this way the debate becomes clear cut. Are you arguing for the void? You wouldn't be arguing for nonsense would you? Of course not. No one would. Belligerence aside, no one knowingly argues for nonsense. For proponents of the void, it is precisely a thing to be made sense of. For critics, it is not.
This impasse seems to be outlined pretty well in the classroom environment: Mathematicians have "0". Philosophers have "non-being." To Mathematicians, 0 is a completely intelligible thing. To Philosophers, 0 is a completely unintelligible thing.
The problem perhaps arises in the inevitable encounters between "0" and "non-being." It looks as though both conceptions of reality cannot exist together and that one has to subordinate the other.
Either:
"0" is an unintelligible thing and Mathematicians need to do some hard Philosophy to understand why.
Or:
"Non-being" in an unintelligible thing and Philosophers need to do some hard Mathematics to understand why.
That's how it looks to me anyways. Seriously, critique.
First of all, I feel we need to take a moment to appreciate your sentence, "Belligerence aside, no one knowingly argues for nonsense."
DeleteOkay, now that that's done with, your delineation between mathematics' and philosophy's conception of void is quite clear and well said. I am wondering why if " 'Non-being' in an unintelligible thing," philosophers need to do math to understand how it is that way? Could you elaborate on that point? because I was with you until then.
Hi Mackenzie. Let's see if I can answer this. My guess is that if we told a Mathematician that non-being is an ontologically vacuous concept, he wouldn't know what to make of what we said. I don't think any amount of Parmenidean or Aristotelian arguments would register.
DeleteTheir logic would be fairly straightforward, "Non-being isn't nonsense. Shouldn't the number zero be sufficient proof?" In the same way Philosophers equate "0" to "non-being", I suspect that Mathematicians equate "non-being" to "0. Each reaches into the others' terminology and finds the underlying assumptions within unpalatable.
By the way, to directly answer one of the original questions, it is not possible for the void to exist in a place. That doesn't even make sense (214b15). If it did, it seems place would have to be boundless, which we have already determined, from the text and in class, is impossible. Place must be bounded in order for us to talk about motion, and we want to talk about motion because we are physicists inquiring about nature (211b25, 214b15-35, and 217a).
ReplyDeleteI agree wholly with Mackenzie above. Though I see that the dispute is not about what Aristotle says but if we have to grant him too much. If we are still arguing about place, we will naturally argue about the void.
ReplyDeleteQuick note: I don't think "0" is unintelligible and I don't think it means pure non-being or non-being simply. It makes sense as the absence or privation of the unit, i.e. One. But as a privation, it is the potency-for-one and thus is understood because the one is understandable. If by non-being we just mean potency, the of course there is non-being, lots of it, all over the place. But that's not what I usually mean by non-being or nothingness. Not-yet-being or has-just-been are both in relation to being. NON-being is not.
I'm going to kind of take a different direction and address what Bronson referred to as his last quick thought ("Last quick thought: Some say outer-space is a void. Response: The space between us on earth and the sun, is in a place, so is a body, thus not a void." This so that everyone doesn't have to scroll up). While I think that the conclusion of the argument is one Aristotle could agree with (namely that there is no void), I think it may be an abuse of Aristotle's conception of place. He defines it as "the innermost motionless boundary of what contains" (4.212a20). In the distance from the Earth to the Sun, you've already gone well beyond that boundary.
ReplyDelete